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Abstract 
The process of globalization and the liberalization of the global trade regime has 
become an integral part of the modern political and economic landscape. The Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently being negotiated between the United 
States and the European Union has the potential to be the most impactful free trade 
agreement of the 21st century as these blocks represent the two largest economies in the 
world. This paper analyzes the conceivable effects of this agreement on the uninvolved 
emerging economies and developing countries of the world. The two main theories on the 
outcome heavily involve the fate of the WTO as a central tool for multilateral trade 
negotiation or just another forgotten organization in Geneva grasping to hold on to its 
former influence. The rise of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) has led 
many experts to speculate on the creation of a dueling system of trade agreements outside 
of the WTO in response to TTIP, while others believe that the agreement will set a new 
standard for trade agreements and rekindle world interest in multilateral negotiations 
through the World Trade Organization. This paper finds that the outcome heavily depends 
on the final outcome of the agreement and whether it meets the comprehensive goals it set 
on. This will largely determine whether or not the WTO remains at the center of the global 
trade regime as well as whether or not TTIP contains an accessible accession clause for 
third parties to join the agreement.  
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Preface 
Economic policy plays an enormous role in today’s globalized political climate. As a 
Public Policy Studies Major with a policy track in international economic policy, I find it 
fascinating how much agreements and policies that so many people know little to nothing 
about can have a tremendous impact on the world around them. The Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership piqued my interest from the first time I learned about its 
tremendous scope.  With the rise of emerging economies and the relative decline of 
western economic domination, TTIP proves to be an intriguing development for the global 
trade regime. The beautiful setting of Geneva, Switzerland with its countless international 
organizations and resources served as a perfect place to delve further into this topic that 
only a select group of people have an in-depth knowledge of at this point. I look forward to 
seeing the outcomes of this agreement as well as how it is perceived by the general public 
as negotiations come to a close and ratification begins.  
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I. Introduction 
The processes of globalization and economic liberalization go hand in hand as they 
integrate the countries and citizens of the world into a post-westphalian society.  The 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and its successor the WTO served as valuable 
vehicles for the liberalization of world trade in the last half of the 20th century. The 
multilateral negotiating rounds sponsored by these organizations have come to a grinding 
halt since the beginning of the Doha Development Round in 2001. The beginning of the 
Doha Development Round took place in the months following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks against the United States at the WTO’s 4th Ministerial Conference and consequently 
took on a historically ambitious negotiating agenda. The round has effectively come to a 
standstill, aside from some recent developments at the Bali conference, as the member 
states seem unable to reach their goals and end the round. This lack of development on the 
multilateral trade negotiation front has led to a resurgence of bilateral free trade 
agreements and regional trade agreements between countries to further the process of 
economic integration and bolster their respective economies. Coupled with the 
development of the emerging economies of the BRIC countries as global economic 
contenders, the lack of WTO leadership has fostered an environment that encourages 
development of so-called ‘super RTAs’ both between developed countries and with 
emerging economies. These RTAs, including TPP and TTIP, have the potential to change the 
global trade regime but there are widely differing opinions on how exactly this will occur.  
 Together, the United States and European union account for approximately 50% of 
global output; thus if concluded, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership 
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would be the largest FTA to ever come to fruition.1 The agreement was announced in US 
President Obama’s 2013 State of the Union Address with little gusto but aims to eliminate 
all tariffs on trade, cut down on costly NTBs, promote greater compatibility between US 
and EU regulations and standards, and create a new standard on issues of global concern in 
a world based rules systems for future trade agreements.2 While the idea of a US-EU FTA is 
not new, TTIP differs from past proposals in that it is being negotiated outside of the WTO 
and 80% of projected gains come from measures other than tariff elimination.3 These 
measures include the likes of cutting bureaucracy and regulation costs as well as 
liberalizing trade in services and public procurement. This unprecedented agreement has 
the potential to alter the global trade regime as a step towards international trade 
liberalization. The immense scale of TTIP has an enormous potential with both economic 
and political implications for third parties. Emerging economies and developing countries 
are not taking part in the negotiating process for TTIP even though it will have major 
effects on the world market. This paper aims to explore the effect that TTIP will have on 
these emerging economies and developing countries both from a trade perspective and 
from a policy perspective as these countries heavily rely on the potentially now obsolete 
WTO for trade negotiations.  
                                                 
1
 OECD. "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Why Does it Matter?." 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. http://www.oecd.org/trade/TTIP.pdf 
(accessed May 6, 2014). 
2
 Executive Office of the President of the United States of America. "White House Fact Sheet: 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)." Office of the United States Trade 
Representative. http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip 
(accessed May 6, 2014). 
3
 Francois, Joseph. "Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic 
Assesment." Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf (accessed May 6, 2014). 
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Before the analysis begins, this paper will present a brief literature review to give a 
basic frame of the current perspectives on TTIP as well as a short review of the research 
methods used. This paper will begin by addressing the factors that gave rise to TTIP and 
how they will affect its outcome. Next it will review the potential impacts on developing 
countries and emerging economies if the full extent of the proposed agreement is 
implemented. Part IV will examine historic trade relations between the EU and US while 
predicting their impact on the final agreement as it pertains to third parties. Part V will 
examine the affects of TTIP on the WTO system and the potential ‘death knell’ of the WTO 
versus a new life for the Doha Round. Part VI will discuss the potential for an accession 
clause as part of TTIP and how it will impact the international trade system. Finally, the 
conclusion will summarize and provide suggestions for using TTIP to further development 
goals and trade liberalization. 
 
Literature Review 
 There is an extensive amount of literature on the potential outcomes of TTIP for the 
EU and US but the externalities of the agreement have not yet been fully explored. The first 
lens through which this topic is being studied is the agreements potential for altering trade 
flows in third party countries. Normally, traditional economic thought would dictate that 
an FTA would lead to trade diversion and creation because of relative and absolute changes 
in the cost of trading for third parties, but in this case EU and US argue that the elimination 
of measures including NTBs and the standardization of regulations will actually decrease 
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the cost of trade for other countries.4 A EU commissioned study by the London based 
Centre for Economic Policy Research goes so far as to say that the benefit will range from 
.07% to .14% of world GDP gain.5 On the other hand, a study commissioned by the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey shows a .16% to .67% loss in GDP for the example country 
of China due to trade losses.6 While it is difficult to assess the impact of TTIP without 
knowing what the final product exactly entails, this shows the sizable disparity between 
hypothesized outcomes largely depending on the theorized liberalization covered by the 
agreement. The prospective positive benefit for third parties from TTIP relies chiefly on the 
extent to which the negotiations between the EU and US are able to agree upon common 
standards and NTB elimination, a topic that this paper will address later on.  
 The second lens through which past literature has attempted to examine the 
externalities of TTIP has been through the effect of the agreement on the existing global 
trade regime and the future of the WTO.  Many developing countries rely on the WTO as 
their only tool for trade liberalization negotiations and thus its future is of paramount 
importance. With the stalling of the Doha round and the new surge in FTAs, many experts 
are divided on how other countries, especially emerging economies, will react to TTIP and 
how it will affect the current system. A US congressional research report echoes the EU and 
US voiced intention to use TTIP to create new ‘globally relevant rules and standards,’ a 
                                                 
4
 European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. "European Commission Fires Starting 
Gun for EU-US Trade Talks." European Commission. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=877&serie=587&langId=en (accessed May 
6, 2014). 
5
 Francois, Joseph. "Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic 
Assesment." Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf (accessed May 6, 2014). 
6
 Aslan, Buhara, Merve Mavuş, and Arif Oduncu. "The Possible Effects of Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership on Chinese Economy." (2014). 
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term that has become increasingly unclear in what exactly it implies about the agreements 
intentions.7 Proponents argue that the coordination of health, labor, environmental, safety, 
and intellectual property rights standards and regulations among others would advance 
the rules based world trade liberalization system and potentially jumpstart the Doha 
Round negotiations again.8 Leading scholar on the topic Suparna Karmakar argues that the 
new higher regulatory standards will not be accepted by emerging economies and 
developing countries due to the high costs, but rather will prompt them to create a dual 
regulatory regime to compete with the new ‘super RTAs.’9 The possibility of an accession 
clause in TTIP would alter both of these potential situations, a topic that is largely 
unexplored and this paper aims to address as well.  
 
Research Methodology  
Given the topicality and ongoing development of TTIP, the availability of peer-
reviewed literature on the subject is sparse. Academic research was conducted primarily 
through the examination of government commissioned studies, statements released by EU 
and US leaders and organizations, analysis from leading think tanks, and commentary by 
prominent political economy experts to provide both original data and interpretations of 
the potential outcomes. Research was conducted primarily at the UN Library in Geneva, 
Switzerland as well as in Nyon, Switzerland.  
                                                 
7
 Akhtar, Shayerah Ilias, and Vivian C. Jones. "Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP): In Brief." Congressional Service Report, July (2013). 
8
 Schott, Jeffrey J., and Cathleen Cimino. "Crafting a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: What Can Be Done." Peterson Institute for International Economics (2013): 13-8. 
9
 Karmakar, Suparna. "Rulemaking in Super-RTAs: Implications for China and India. Bruegel 
Working Paper 2014/03, March 2014." (2014). 
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In addition, academic interviews were conducted with leading trade officials from 
the US and EU as well as other third party countries and prominent think tank experts. 
Interviews with trade officials were conducted in person and in good faith while the 
interview with a think tank expert was done via video call. There were no ethical concerns 
with the research on this topic, but the confidentiality of trade officials was of the utmost 
importance. Interviewees included officials from the respective missions to the WTO of 
Switzerland, and Brazil as well as an official from the office of the USTR and an EU trade 
official. This combination of unique perspectives from interviews and academic research 
provided a healthy spectrum of stakeholders’ views to allow a multi-faceted analysis of the 
externalities both direct and indirect of TTIP.  
 
 
 
 
II. Why now? 
Between the failure of the WTO’s Doha Round to conclude, the rise of emerging 
economies, and the natural geopolitical and economic ties between the EU and US, the final 
product of the TTIP negotiations will reflect the current geopolitical atmosphere and goals 
of the signatories. Some point to TTIP as a product of the Doha Round’s failure to advance 
global trade liberalization, others suggest TTIP is an attempt at an ‘economic NATO’ against 
emerging economies, while still some see it as a natural economic progression between 
geopolitical allies. While the actual reasoning may be a combination of all of these factors, 
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the outcome of the agreement and at least some of its effects on third parties likely stems 
from each of them.  
 
 
 
Standstill of Doha and Global Trade Liberalization 
One commonly agreed upon factor that prompted the TTIP negotiations is the 
failure of the Doha Round to produce meaningful results aside from the Bali Package. 
Initially, the EU was following the Lamy Doctrine of not negotiating further FTAs while the 
Doha Round was underway but this was quickly abandoned as Doha came to a standstill.10 
The multilateral trading system though has been without a leader since the WTO 
negotiations came to a halt and the global will to continue trade liberalization has 
continued as we see its manifestation in TTIP.11 There has been a clear shift in the trade 
agenda of major global trading nations towards bilateral and regional agreements due to 
the lack of progress in with Doha.12 The EU perspective offers a strong belief in competitive 
liberalization and Domino Theory as a major motivation behind TTIP as it attempts to 
spurn progress.13 In this light TTIP can be seen as a way of moving forward with trade 
liberalization, at least for the nations involved. An expert from the Atlantic Council even 
suggested that these negotiations would be taking place inside of the WTO were it not for 
                                                 
10
 Seshadri, V. S. "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership." Reasearch and Information 
System for Developing Countries Working Paper, November 2013. (2013). 
11
 Erixon, Fredrik. "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Shifting 
Structure of Global Trade Policy." In CESifo Forum, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 18-22. Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research at the University of Munich, 2014. 
12
 Karmakar, Suparna. "Life after Bali: Renewing the World Trade Negotiating 
Agenda." Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/17 (2013). 
13
 EU Official, Interview by author. Personal interview. Geneva, April 14, 2014. 
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the recalcitrance of some members.14 The attempt to liberalize trade and create common 
standards between the EU and US would not have progressed in the current multilateral 
trade negotiation climate, but the parties do have the intent to create growth beyond just 
the EU and US.  
 
The Rise of ‘the Rest’ 
 ‘The rise of the rest’ is a commonly used term to describe the emergence of BRIC 
countries among others as compared to the major powers at the end of WWII that control 
many international systems. The EU and US are among the countries many are now arguing 
are overrepresented in post WWII institutions including GATT and its successor the WTO. 
Thus TTIP can be seen as an attempt by the western powers to maintain control of the 
international trading regime in the face of competition from emerging economies. Hillary 
Clinton is credited with calling a transatlantic FTA an ‘economic NATO’ in a rare reference 
by EU or US leaders to TTIP being a maneuver to consolidate economic power.15 Outside of 
official channels though TTIP is often discussed as a way for western powers to coordinate 
standards while they still have the ability as emerging economies are predicted to overtake 
them economically in the near future.16 The agreements negotiation goals do in fact 
mention the setting of global standards in arenas that are not especially of concern for the 
EU and US. An interviewed US trade official remarked that in an explicit way TTIP aims to 
serve as a model for other countries, specifically emerging economies, on topics such as 
                                                 
14
 Workman, Garrett, Interview by author. Personal interview. Video Call, April 11, 2014. 
15
 Erixon, Fredrik. "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Shifting 
Structure of Global Trade Policy." In CESifo Forum, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 18-22. Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research at the University of Munich, 2014. 
16
 Workman, Garrett, Interview by author. Personal interview. Video Call, April 11, 2014. 
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state owned enterprises, manipulation, anti-trust regulations, and intellectual property 
rights among others.17 The heavy implication of Chinese regulation is clear in these goals as 
they have all been part of the popular western discourse on Chinese trade policy problems 
in the past. Using TTIP as an example for future trade agreements with the aforementioned 
topics as a non-traditional segment would not intentionally harm the economies of 
emerging economies or developing countries. For example, treatment of state owned 
enterprises can often create unfair competition for foreign firms but in the long term 
changing regulations to create a fair playing field would create growth that benefits both 
sides. Perhaps in the short run there would be negative effects to sectors that had previous 
regulations, but in the long run global trade liberalization would be more achievable, or at 
least that is the perceived intent.  
 
Natural Progression 
  The US and EU are each others primary trade and investment partners and thus 
some see TTIP as a natural progression of their economic relationship to try to liberalize 
trade and create a template for other countries to do the same. In 2012, 44% of FDI inflows 
into the US came from the EU and 63% of US FDI went to the EU.18 This is just one example 
of the large level to which the EU and US are already economically integrated. An 
interviewed EU official offered the explanation that TTIP is a result of similar trading 
partners trying to bolster their economies after the 2008 financial crisis among other 
                                                 
17
 US Trade Official, Interview by author. Personal interview. Geneva, April 28, 2014. 
18
 OECD. "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Why Does it Matter?." 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. http://www.oecd.org/trade/TTIP.pdf 
(accessed May 6, 2014). 
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things.19 As already tightly integrated trading partners, an FTA offered the opportunity for 
a financial stimulus at little to no cost to either side all while setting global standards in the 
process.20 In effect, TTIP could act as a global stimulus package if regulatory convergence 
and the elimination of NTBs are achieved.  In fact, with the globalized economics of today’s 
world it would be counterintuitive to liberalize trade with one market to try to limit 
exposure to another; economies are so integrated that it would have the reverse effect than 
desired.21 Deeper global trade liberalization through the adoption of TTIP example led 
agreements is intended to create growth but the short term drawbacks in cost are difficult 
for many to swallow. The implication here is that TTIP is more than just an attempt by 
western powers to stave off the growth of the BRIC countries or a Doha Round reach 
around, its intent is seemingly to bolster trade both between the US and EU as well as the 
rest of the world in the long term.  
 
 
 
 
III. Perspectives on TTIP from third Parties 
 The potential impact of TTIP on emerging economies and developing countries 
would be extensive if the agreement comes to fruition addressing all of its current goals. 
Tariffs between the US and EU are already relatively low, right around 4% on average, but 
                                                 
19
 EU Official, Interview by author. Personal interview. Geneva, April 14, 2014. 
20
 Workman, Garrett, Interview by author. Personal interview. Video Call, April 11, 2014. 
21
 Erixon, Fredrik. "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Shifting 
Structure of Global Trade Policy." In CESifo Forum, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 18-22. Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research at the University of Munich, 2014. 
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the costs of bureaucracy, dueling standards, and regulations can add 10 to 20%.22 Nearly 
80% of predicted economic gains from TTIP come from the elimination of these NTBs, but 
there is a distinct potential for discrimination with the elimination of NTBs as well as 
tariffs.23 Overall, the outcome depends heavily on the specifics of the final agreement but 
the theoretical consequences given the full-proposed agreement can be examined. 
 
Tariff Removal 
 As proposed, TTIP aims to remove virtually all tariffs between the EU and US. 
Though these tariffs are already relatively small their elimination can have a large global 
impact. A study by the Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex has shown 
enormous potential for trade discrimination from even these small tariffs being removed; 
the larger the MFN tariff, the more damage TTIP will cause to the respective countries’ 
industry.24 Tariff sheltered industries such as agriculture, textiles, and footwear are the 
most at risk for trade diversion as it may become less expensive for these products to be 
produced within the signatories of TTIP than to for the large internal markets to purchase 
them from developing countries.25 Many LDCs already enjoy tariff free access to the EU and 
US through various arrangements like the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and 79 
LDCs from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific though so the impact of tariff reductions 
will be limited. Many share the point of view that there is not much concern for trade 
                                                 
22
 Karmakar, Suparna. "Rulemaking in Super-RTAs: Implications for China and India. Bruegel 
Working Paper 2014/03, March 2014." (2014). 
23
 Ibid,. 
24
 Rollo, Jim, Peter Holmes, Spencer Henson, M. Mendez Parra, Sarah Ollerenshaw, J. Lopez 
Gonzalez, Xavier Cirera, and Matteo Sandi. "Potential Effects of the Proposed Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership on Selected Developing Countries." Centre for the Analysis of 
Regional Integration, University of Sussex (2013). 
25
 Ibid,. 
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diversion from tariff reduction as TTIP is about wealth creation and not trade diversion.26 
Table 1 shows the potential effects of only tariff elimination, on the example country of 
Germany and its trade with the BRIC countries. Under the ‘tariff scenario’ column the 
effects on both imports and exports between Germany and the BRIC countries can be seen. 
The predicted exports from Germany to BRICs actually rise because of increased price 
competitiveness due to the import of intermediate products from the US, all the while 
exports from the BRICs to Germany fall due to trade diversion.27 The net effect is relatively 
minor but there is clearly potential for trade diversion even with the reduction of already 
low tariffs.  
 
 Table 1. Change in German Foreign Trade with BRIC countries28 
                                                 
26
 Workman, Garrett, Interview by author. Personal interview. Video Call, April 11, 2014. 
 
27
 Felbermayr, G. J., Benedikt Heid, and Sybille Lehwald. "Transatlantic trade and investment 
partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal? Part 1: Macroeconomic 
Effects." Bertelsmann Foundation http://www. bfna. org/sites/default/files/TTIPGED% 
20study% 2017June 202013 (2013). 
28
 Ibid,. 
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NTB Removal and Regulatory Convergence 
The majority of TTIP’s impact stems from the elimination of NTBs through 
agreements on areas such as cutting red tape and increasing coordination between 
regulators. While more complicated, NTBs actually block more trade than traditional tariffs 
do.29 An EU commission brief offers an excellent example of how this will work for the auto 
industry.30 Safety regulations are different in the EU and the US and thus carmakers must 
build, test, and produce cars with different standards for each market. If regulators simply 
agreed that both systems produce safe and reliable cars while recognizing each other’s 
standards, carmakers could save unnecessary expenditures by testing and producing only 
one model. Theoretically this benefits non-signatory countries that will be able to save time 
and money with the increased regulatory coordination that lowers the marginal or fixed 
costs of production.31 EU President Jose Manuel Barroso has called for the agreement to be 
a ‘living document’ with the potential to evolve as regulatory demands change to 
                                                 
29
 US Trade Official, Interview by author. Personal interview. Geneva, April 28, 2014. 
30
 European Commission. "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership." European 
Commission: Trade. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151605.pdf 
(accessed May 6, 2014). 
31
 Felbermayr, Gabriel J., and Mario Larch. "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP): Potentials, Problems and Perspectives." InCESIfo Forum, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 49-60. Ifo 
Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, 2013. 
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continually allow more enterprises easier access to the US-EU market.32 Thus the 
agreement intends to change to suit new technologies and changes in preferences for the 
benefit of both the signatories’ producers and third party countries’ producers.  
On the other hand, many studies and political arguments fail to address the fact that 
NTB elimination and regulatory convergence also creates the potential for trade 
discrimination.33 Some producers may not be able to afford the regulatory standards or it 
may be cheaper to produce something under one regulatory standard or another in a 
different country and thus trade diversion is entirely possible. The ‘Comprehensive 
Liberalization’ column of Table 1 shows how strong of an effect this can have on the 
example country of Germany and its trade relations with the BRIC countries. The results 
show a clearly negative impact on German-BRIC trade relations and substantially larger so 
than those of the ‘tariff scenario’ where only traditional tariffs are eliminated.  
Restructuring or fragmentation of global supply chains is highly possible, especially 
depending on the reactions of emerging markets.34 There is potential for countries to either 
accept the new standards as global and with higher costs as China did when it joined the 
WTO in 2001 or create a dual regulatory regime the potential of which will be examined 
later in this paper.35 From a Brazilian perspective, regulatory convergence will not actually 
                                                 
32
 Barker, Tyson. "On the "Outs" An Early Economic Conundrum for the US-EU Trade Deal." 
German Council on Foreign Relations. https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/outs 
(accessed May 4, 2014). 
33
 Swiss Trade Official, Interview by author. Personal interview. Geneva, April 11, 2014. 
34
 Karmakar, Suparna. "Prospects for regulatory convergence under TTIP. Bruegel Policy 
Contribution 2013/15, October 2013." (2013). 
35
 Ibid,. 
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create a benefit for countries outside the agreement as proponents of the agreement argue, 
but the potential for trade discrimination is still present with NTBs.36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. EU-US Historical Trade Relations and the Elimination of NTBs 
The elimination of NTBs and the convergence of regulations serve as the potential 
cornerstone of the TTIP agreement although many stakeholders are skeptical that the EU 
and US will be able to agree to the extent proposed. Others are extremely optimistic and 
see a strong political will behind TTIP that will push the agreement into fruition. Historic 
transatlantic trade proposals, trade dispute history between the EU and US, and a 
difference in regulatory approaches must be examined to determine the palpability of NTB 
elimination and regulatory convergence as they pertain to the agreements externalities. A 
recent survey of stakeholders by the Atlantic Council and Bertelsmann Foundation showed 
that only 29% of respondents believed a broad or comprehensive agreement would be 
reached between the EU and US, a 6% drop from the prior year.37 This suggests that some 
of the more contentious issues will not be included in order to ensure an agreement. 
 
                                                 
36
 Brazilian Trade Official, Interview by author. Personal Interview. Geneva, May 5, 2014.  
37
 Stanton, Joshua, Kara Sutton, and Garrett Workman. "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: On Track but Off Message?" Atlantic Council & Bertelsmann Foundation, 
Washington DC (2014). 
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Historic Trade Proposals 
 TTIP is hardly the first time a transatlantic FTA has been proposed. Within the 
context of the Cold War, the US proposed the creation of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area 
in the 1960s that never came to be.38 Then in the 1990s the EU pushed for a Transatlantic 
Free Trade area that was no more successful than its predecessor but it did lead to the 
creation of the New Transatlantic Agenda as a forum to promote transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation.39 The New Transatlantic Economic Partnership replaced the New 
Transatlantic Agenda inn 2007 through an initiative from US President Bush and German 
Chancellor Merkel with modest economic results.40 If the history of EU-US attempted 
transatlantic trade proposals is any indication of how successful TTIP will be then chances 
of an ambitious elimination of NTBs and regulatory convergence are slim at best. There is a 
strong history of lobbied interests in NTBs in both the US and EU which may continue to 
prevent a comprehensive agreement and instead replace it with a much less impactful set 
of conditions.41 If this is the case, the developing countries and emerging economies do not 
need to worry about the potential impact of TTIP, as it will be relatively minor as past 
initiatives have been.  
 
Dispute History 
 The EU and US have a long and storied history of trade disputes in GATT and the 
WTO over a wide range of issues that could reflect on the potential outcomes of TTIP. 
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There have been disputes over chlorine treated poultry, hormone treated beef, and 
genetically modified crops, only the beef dispute having been resolved, just to name a few 
high profile ones.42 One perspective offered is that the abundance of trade disputes 
between the EU and US is unavoidable due to the higher prevalence of attorneys within 
these areas than in other areas of the world.43 Others argue that there is sufficient political 
will to overcome these differences, though it will not be easy because of their political and 
economic sensitivity.44 Either way there is a clear difference in regulation processes and 
ideas that have been a point of contention in the past, whether or not they spill over into 
the TTIP negotiations is yet to be seen but highly likely. Some areas of controversy are not 
even being included in negotiations such as agricultural and aircraft industry subsidies but 
negotiators must continue to tread lightly as contentious topics may ruin the entire 
negotiating process due to its ‘single undertaking’ nature.45 
 
Different Regulatory Approaches 
 The ambition of NTB elimination and regulatory convergence is widely considered 
to be extremely difficult especially when the difference in culture and regulatory 
approaches of the EU and US are taken into account. The EU and US are so culturally 
different in the ways they think about regulation and protectionism that their goals may 
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occur but not with the full force that they are proposing.46 EU regulations generally rely on 
the precautionary principle while US ones insist on science-based determinations about 
safety and health.47 An EU official compared EU-US trade relations to a marriage where the 
couple agrees on most things but the 5-10% that they disagree on causes all of the 
problems; in this case its that EU regulators prefer to regulate more before hand and US 
ones prefer to use science to get products to market quicker but with less testing in 
general.48 Since the majority of TTIPs impact comes from cross cutting regulatory barriers 
and mutual recognition, this ‘marital 5-10% difference’ is crucial to resolve if the 
agreement is to be at all as ambitious as proposed. Some critics argue that while the 
ambition level of the proposed agreement is possible, the finished product will not be as 
comprehensive as imagined due to these differences.49 There is no way of knowing until the 
final TTIP agreement is revealed how well negotiators are able to settle these differences.  
 
 
 
 
V. TTIP and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System 
The stagnancy of the WTO’s Doha Development Round combined with the surge in 
bilateralism and RTAs has brought the future of the multilateral trading system into 
question. As the largest FTA ever attempted, TTIP is paving the way for the future trading 
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system but there is widespread debate on where it is going. Some see TTIP as sparking the 
international trade regime into a renewal of the Doha Round negotiations while others see 
TTIP as the death knell of the WTO and the beginning of bilateral and plurilateral 
agreements that spawn dueling regulatory systems. The distinction between these two 
futures would make an enormous difference on the trade policies of emerging economies 
and LDCs. These countries rely heavily on the multilateral negotiations of the WTO for 
trade liberalization agreements as they lack the clout or finances to negotiate themselves.  
 
BRIC and LDC Reliance on the WTO 
 The WTO system, though with its own flaws, allows all members to actively 
participate in negotiations and while many do not have the means to negotiate on their 
own they often group together to at least have their opinions heard. Thus the continuation 
of this system with the conclusion of the Doha round is of utmost importance for LDCs and 
emerging economies. The loss of the Doha Round would create a tough and detrimental 
situation for LDCs and emerging economies in terms of their ability to compete with 
developed nations.50 This is due to the fact that without the WTO, many countries will not 
be privy to negotiating the rules of trade agreements and will thus be forced to accept the 
possibly unfriendly terms of an agreement or risk being left out completely.51 Many 
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countries are hesitant to even sign agreements that they did not negotiate themselves so as 
to not risk becoming rule takers over rule makers.52 
 
Completion of Doha 
 The question of whether of not the bilateral TTIP negotiations will prompt a 
revitalization of multilateral negotiations is likely the single most important question for 
the global trade regime as a whole. Regional integration efforts can be seen as having a 
twofold effect on multilateral liberalization; they reduce incentives for signatory nations to 
make concessions in multilateral negotiations while simultaneously increasing the benefits 
for initially third party countries.53 The conclusion of NAFTA in the 1990s served as a spark 
for the multilateral negotiations in the WTOs Uruguay round as many countries feared its 
trade diversion effects.54 There is widespread speculation that the TTIP and TPP 
negotiations will serve as a similar spark for the Doha Round negotiations.55 Other 
proponents argue that cross cutting regulatory processes and solving disagreements 
between the EU and US could become a new “golden standard” for trade agreements and 
thus serve as a template for talks in the stalled Doha Round.56 China and India have shown 
a pragmatic acceptance of stricter regulations in the past as a cost of doing business in a 
global market so proponents are hoping they will do the same with the heightened 
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standards of TTIP.57 . At a recent speech to the US Chamber of Commerce German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel stated, “I am convinced that any progress we make in TTIP will 
create progress in Geneva at the WTO.”58 This statement clearly signals support for TTIP to 
spurn progress in the Doha Round and as it comes from the Chancellor of Germany it 
shows the strong political will backing it. Oppositional views though argue that given the 
aforementioned problems with eliminating NTBs and regulatory convergence there will 
not be anything solid to serve as a multilateral template. Doha clearly must be dealt with if 
the international trading system is to move anywhere but how it is concluded depends very 
much on the reactions of other countries to the emerging series of super RTAs of which 
TTIP is the largest.59 
 
Dueling Regulatory Regimes 
 TTIP is alternatively viewed by many as the death knell of the WTO on the 
assumption that the agreement will in turn spark the creation of more RTAs with dueling 
regulatory regimes to compete. There are several situations that could lead to the creation 
of dueling RTAs and regulatory regimes from TTIP. The first situation would be if emerging 
economies and developing countries do not accept the multilateralization of the new higher 
standards from TTIP out of sheer fear of exclusion. The pressure exerted by TTIP on 
emerging economies may not be enough to force them to adopt the new standards. An 
example of this can be seen in the 1996 Information Technology Agreement that China and 
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India refused to join even in the face of export competition.60 Domestic markets in these 
emerging economies already account for more than 40% of global economic activity thus 
future internal demand from the price sensitive growing middle class could prompt the 
creation of a dual regulatory regime to benefit these needs over accepting those of TTIP.61 
Alternatively, emerging economies may choose to create dueling RTAs and thus regulatory 
regimes among themselves because they can create more beneficial terms than those of 
TTIP.62 If either of these scenarios play out, the WTO will be rendered ineffective as each 
RTA diminishes its ability to serve as a multilateral trade mediator. An anonymous trade 
official even pointed out that within the confines of a FTA, article XXIV of GATT basically 
allows countries to do whatever they please in terms of trade discrimination and 
regulations as these agreements override the WTOs MFN principle. This outcome is much 
more likely if TTIP comes to fruition as the full comprehensive agreement that is currently 
proposed but again many stakeholders do not believe the proposed agreement to be 
possible in its entirety. 
 The effects of these dual regulatory regimes would be detrimental for those not 
involved in the new RTAs. If uninvolved, countries would be subject to not only trade 
discrimination in the form of tariffs, but in the form of unfair standards and NTBs.63 
Emerging economies could create RTAs among themselves and as LDCs will not have a 
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voice in the negotiations, as they do in the WTO, to address domestic concerns and 
sensitivities.64 LDCs are less attractive partners for RTAs and are thus likely to not even be 
included in final agreements to their detriment.65 As for emerging economies, their creation 
of RTAs would likely be beneficial in the short to medium term, but in the long term the 
lack of regulatory cooperation and systems of competing RTAs would not work in their 
favor as trade would not be liberalized to allow for maximum growth. Both LDCs and 
emerging economies would be hurt long term if TTIP spawned as system of RTAs and 
dueling trade regimes instead of multilateralization and thus it is in their best interest to 
finish the Doha Round possibly even with the increased regulations from TTIP.  
 
 
 
 
VI. Accession Clause or Expansion of TTIP? 
The potential for other countries to accede to TTIP would strengthen the agreement 
and create more pressure on other countries to accept the standards on a multilateral 
basis. US Secretary of State John Kerry even stated “Turkey needs to play a significant role 
in TTIP.”66 Representatives from BRIC countries, Canada, Mexico, and turkey have been 
attending recent forums and discussions on TTIP some of which have even declared a 
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public interest in joining TTIP.67 Though for now negotiators on both sides “have not ruled 
out the possibility of others joining but are currently focused on creating the best possible 
agreement before others enter.”68 The problem becomes that the more countries involved 
in the negotiations, the less comprehensive the agreement will be; but in turn without 
other countries the terms may become too strict and some may not want to join.69 For 
example there is an accession clause in NAFTA but no new nations have joined the 
agreement since its inception.70 A leading analyst succinctly phrased this conundrum as 
“the days of neo-classical ‘build it and they’ll beg to join’ treaty constructs are long over.”71 
The future for accession to TTIP is anything but clear. Perhaps the name of the agreement 
hints at further membership. Many traditional FTAs are named after the signatory 
countries, for example the recent US-Korea FTA that was aptly nicknamed KORUS, but 
TTIP’s nomenclature implies more than just EU-US trade. Though this may be stretching 
the available evidence, there is no indication that the agreement will not contain at least a 
limited accession clause. This would be beneficial long term to emerging markets and LDCs, 
despite potential short-term drawbacks from trade discrimination, as the agreement would 
be more likely to be multilateralized and thus liberalize world trade 
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VII. Conclusion 
 While TTIP does endeavor to expand global trade, the issue of development is not 
brought up in any of the stated goals. If development goals are kept in mind, TTIP has the 
potential to create a meaningful impact on LDCs and emerging economies. Using TTIP to 
regulate tariffs and NTBs that encourage development would increase the potential for 
progress in the Doha Round as there will already be a template that many countries will be 
in favor of. Sandler Trade LLC prepared a unique report that outlines ways in which TTIP 
could be used to spurn global economic development with the following actions:72 
1. “Adopt standards harmonization, rather than mutual recognition agreements, for 
products that emerging economies export to the TTIP markets to ensure benefits 
also flow to them. 
2. Extend the benefits of mutual recognition to emerging economies for products that 
they also export to TTIP markets. 
3. Where bilateral removal of tariffs and NTBs is likely to adversely affect competing 
emerging- economy exports, provide potentially affected countries the opportunity 
to negotiate plurilateral or multilateral liberalization. 
4.  For key exports of emerging economies (as identified by them), harmonize the U.S. 
and EU preferential rules of origin as well as overall product, shipment, and 
inspection standards. 
5. Grant the benefits of TTIP tariff elimination and NTB removal or reduction to GSP 
beneficiary countries.” 
 
The effect of these measures would help to ease the potential burden on LDCs and 
emerging economies as well as promote their development which could lead to a growth in 
trade with the EU and US as well. This paper recommends TTIP include these 
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aforementioned policies to help ensure the well being of the rest of the countries not 
involved in the agreement.  
 The EU and US represent approximately half of global output, and thus a FTA 
between the two powers has the potential to be extremely impactful on the world stage. As 
a FTA, TTIP is unprecedented in several ways. First, if concluded it will be the largest FTA 
ever undertaken. Second, nearly 80% of the agreements potential benefit comes from areas 
other than tariff changes like NTB elimination and cross-regulatory convergence. Finally, it 
aims to tackle areas not traditionally covered in FTAs like t the setting of new standards on 
topics like state owned enterprises, currency manipulation, intellectual property rights, 
and competition policy. This paper aimed to examine the agreements affects on emerging 
economies and LDCs as part of the development of global trade liberalization.  
The analysis of this topic begins with why the agreement was formed in the first 
place. The emergence of BRIC economies as global powers coupled with the standstill of the 
WTO’s Doha Development Round created the necessity for trade leadership in 
liberalization outside the WTO. The EU and US are attempting to use TTIP to this extent by 
creating a template for future trade agreements that can hopefully be brought back to the 
WTO. Traditionally, FTAs create trade diversion among non-participatory nations and 
trade creation within the agreement. The tariffs between the EU and US are already 
relatively low though and thus these effects will be minimal. Proponents of the agreement 
argue that the non-tariff measures of TTIP will serve to benefit third party countries but 
studies have shown that the potential for trade discrimination due to these actions is 
equally high. The EU and US have a long and storied history of trade disputes though that 
imply that the agreements ambitious goals will not be completely realized despite a strong 
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political will. If TTIP is able conclude with all of the original provisions of NTB removal and 
regulatory convergence, the effect on third parties and the global trading system will 
largely depend on the reactions of emerging economies. These countries may accept the 
new regulations as a higher cost of conducting global business and thus help pave the road 
to the multilateralization of the arrangements or they could form dueling regulatory 
regimes that would harm the world economy in the long run. A utilized accession clause in 
TTIP could help provide the support to spark progress in the Doha round by example. 
Overall though, the outcome of TTIP for third parties depends heavily on the extent to 
which the agreement goes in terms of liberalization and standard setting as well as the 
reaction of emerging economies to their implementation.  
Further study could be done on the agreements potential effects on developed 
economies with close relations to the EU and US like Canada, Mexico, Turkey, Norway, and 
Switzerland. The future of the global trade regime is at play with the negotiation of TTIP, 
but with such a mammoth undertaking there is little to no way to predict a definitive 
outcome even for the most seasoned of experts. While some hear the death knell of the 
WTO, others hear the chorus of a renewed multilateral trading agenda. The only clear 
sound for now is the hushed discussion between EU and US negotiators that will shape the 
foreseeable global trade regime for better or for worse.  
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Abbreviation List  
 
BRIC    Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
DSB    Dispute Settlement Body 
EU    European Union 
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment 
GATT    General Agreement on Trade and Tarriffs 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
LDC    Less Developed Country 
MFN    Most Favored Nation 
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NAFTA   North American Free Trade Agreement 
NTB    Non-Tariff Barrier 
FTA    Free Trade Agreement 
RTA    Regional Trade Agreement  
TPP    Trans-Pacific Partnership 
TTIP    Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
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UN    United Nations 
US    United States 
USTR    United States Trade Representative 
WTO    World Trade Organization 
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